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ABSTRACT
Exploring the Reliability and Validity of
the Experiential Discounting Task
by
Rochelle R. Smits, Master of Science
Utah State University, 2012
Major Professor: Dr. Gregory J. Madden
Department: Psychology

Delay discounting (the devaluation of rewards delayed in time) has been studied
extensively using animal models with psychophysical adjustment procedures. Similar
procedures were soon developed to assess delay discounting in humans. Although across
species the same mathematical function relates discounted value to imposed delay,
several methodological concerns have been implicated in human delay discounting
procedures. A procedure recently developed to address these concerns is the Experiential
Discounting Task (EDT). This task arranges experienced delays and rewards that humans
make decisions regarding—experiencing the outcomes of their choices within session
before making additional choices. The popularity of this procedure has been fueled by
reports of its sensitivity to acute experimental manipulation, and that it has been
predictive of treatment success. Similar sensitivity results have not been found when a
traditional delay discounting task (DDT) has been used. Though the EDT appears useful
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for a variety of reasons, it has not been subjected to the same rigorous internal validity
and reliability tests that traditional DDTs have. In two experiments we examined the testretest reliability of the EDT (Experiment 1) and the way in which choice trials are
regulated (Experiment 2). Results demonstrate that the EDT is reliable across time and
choice is insensitive to trial regulation differences. We conclude with a critique of the
EDT as a procedure for assessing delay discounting and hypothesize other processes it
may be measuring.
(80 pages)
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT
Exploring the Reliability and Validity of
the Experiential Discounting Task
Rochelle R. Smits
Delay discounting is the devaluation of rewards that are delayed in time. This
phenomenon was first studied with animals in controlled laboratory environments and
later translated to human procedures. Though the decrease in value of outcomes as the
delay to receipt increases is the same across species (money for humans, food for
animals), a number of methodological concerns have been raised about the procedures
used to study delay discounting in humans.
The Experiential Discounting Task (EDT) was recently developed in order to study delay
discounting in humans in a way that is more similar to that used with animals. That is,
humans make repeated decisions concerning outcomes they experience within session
(delays and rewards). The EDT has proven useful for a variety of reasons including its
ability to detect changes in how delayed rewards are discounted as a function of acute
alcohol where traditional measures have not. However, this measure has yet to undergo
rigorous tests of internal validity and reliability that previous measures of delay
discounting have.
In two experiments we tested the reliability and internal validity of the EDT. First we
assessed the test-retest reliability across seven days. Next we tested whether the way in
which choices are presented in the EDT affects choice. In addition, all participants
completed a traditional delay discounting task, boredom proneness scale and probability
discounting task.
Experiment 1 resulted in good test-retest reliability for all tasks, including the EDT and
the traditional measure of delay discounting. In Experiment 2 we found that individual
performance did not change as a function of how choices were presented. Across both
experiments we found no evidence for a correlation between discounting in the EDT and
the traditional measure. Though reliable across time we contend, based on the relation to
a traditional delay discounting task and the reviewed literature that there is little evidence
that the EDT is a valid measure of delay discounting and call for more research to
determine what process underlies decision-making in the EDT.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Delay discounting is the systematic decrease in the subjective value of an
outcome as the delay to its receipt increases (for review see Madden & Bickel, 2010).
Delay discounting is thought to underlie a specific type of impulsivity (Ainslie, 1975) –
one characterized by preference for a smaller-sooner (SS) reward over an objectively
larger but delayed reward with a present (discounted) value below that of the SS reward.
For example, pay-day loan services profit from those who choose to obtain a small
amount of cash now (SS) over a larger amount of money dispersed later (LL) when the
next paycheck arrives. The choice provides evidence that the value of the LL payment is
discounted below the undiscounted value of immediate cash.
Review of Delay Discounting
The seminal work in delay discounting was conducted in nonhuman animal labs
and used titrating procedures borrowed from psychophysics (e.g., Mazur, 1987). In these
studies, the shape and steepness of the delay discounting function were investigated by
giving animals (such as rats or pigeons) repeated choices between SS and LL amounts of
food at a range of delays. At each delay, the animal’s choices were used to quantify the
subjective (discounted) value of the LL reward. One commonly used method for
accomplishing this is to make choice-dependent adjustments to the amount of the
immediate reward until the animal is indifferent between the LL and SS rewards (e.g.,
Green, Myerson & Calvert, 2010; Richards, Mitchell, de Wit, & Seiden, 1997). Figure 1
shows two hyperbolic discounting functions that well characterize animal choices under
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this procedure. The steepness of the curve reflects the rate at which delayed rewards are
discounted and is quantified as the k-parameter in the hyperbolic discounting equation
proposed by Mazur (1987):
(1)
where V is the present value of a reward of amount (A), available after a delay (D).
Higher k values reflect steeper discounting as illustrated in Figure 1.

Percent Value

100

k = .05
k = .2

80
60
40
20
0
0

10

20

30

Delay

Figure 1. Two illustrative discounting curves.

In the last 20 years, a considerable amount of research has explored variants of
these methods to examine the shape and steepness of the delay discounting function in
humans. Most of these studies employ hypothetical monetary outcomes and an adjustingamount procedure similar to the one described above (e.g., Rachlin, Raineri, & Cross,
1991). The vast majority of research suggests that Equation 1 provides a better fit of
human delay discounting than does a normative exponential equation that was favored by
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economists for a majority of the 20th century (Samuelson, 1937).1 This finding suggests
that a comparable behavioral/cognitive process underlies human and animal discounting
of delayed rewards.
That being said, four concerns have often been raised about the procedures used
to study delay discounting in humans: a) the vast majority, if not all, of the rewards used
in these studies are hypothetical prospects rather than real consequences of choice
(Lawyer, Schoepflin, Green, & Jenks, 2011), b) the delays to the LL reward are verbal
descriptions of delays rather than real delays that will be experienced (Lagorio &
Madden, 2005), c) steady-state procedures characterizing the animal literature are not
used with humans (Lagorio & Madden, 2005), and d) variables that would appear to
affect impulsive decision-making in natural environments (e.g., opportunity costs,
probabilistic delayed outcomes) are not represented in these discounting tasks (Reynolds,
2006).
Each of these concerns appears to have motivated the development of the
Experiential Discounting Task (EDT) as an alternative method of assessing human delay
discounting (Reynolds & Schiffbauer, 2004). In the EDT, humans make choices
involving real SS and LL rewards and real delays to their delivery. The EDT uses an
adjusting amount procedure similar to that used with nonhumans; that is, the amount of
the SS reward is incremented (decremented) on trial ti+1 after this alternative was chosen
(forgone) on trial ti. Monetary rewards, and delays to these rewards, are experienced for
each choice made in the EDT and before additional choices are made. Finally, choices

1

See Green & Myerson (2004) for evidence that a hyperbola-like equation provides a better fit to human,
but not animal delay discounting data.
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continue to be made at a single delay until a stable pattern of decision making is detected
(Reynolds, Penfold, & Patak, 2008; Reynolds, Richards, & de Wit, 2006; Shiels et al.,
2009; Voon et al., 2010). An attractive feature of the EDT is that multiple indifference
points are obtained in a single session; making it possible to derive a k-value in
approximately 20 minutes. Thus, the procedure appears ideal when studying experimental
manipulations anticipated to produce time-limited effects on delay discounting (e.g.,
sleep deprivation or drugs; Reynolds & Schiffbauer, 2004; Voon et al., 2010).
A second apparent benefit of the EDT is that choice under this procedure is
sensitive to acute experimental manipulations, whereas choices made in discounting tasks
using hypothetical rewards and delays are largely insensitive to these manipulations (see
review by de Wit & Mitchell, 2010). For example, Reynolds et al. (2006) found that
alcohol consumption increased the steepness of delay discounting curves when these
curves were assessed with the EDT, whereas choice in a hypothetical-rewards delay
discounting task was unaffected by alcohol (see also Richards, Zhang, Mitchell, & de
Wit, 1999). Choices made in the EDT have also proven sensitive to sleep deprivation
(Reynolds & Schiffbauer, 2004); the dopamine D2/D3 agonist, pramipexole (Voon et al.,
2010); and, methylphenidate in children diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity
disorder (Shiels et al., 2009). This point is illustrated in Table 1 which summarizes effect
sizes from the small number of studies that have used both the EDT and a delay
discounting task (DDT). An effect size is a standardized mean difference between
experimental and control group/condition; positive effect sizes indicate that the
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experimental manipulation increased impulsivity. Table 1 illustrates that the EDT has
produced larger effect sizes than the DDT (Mann-Whitney U = 3.5, p < .05).

Table 1
EDT and DDT Effect Size Comparison for Studies that Evaluated Experimental
Manipulations

EDT

DDT

Acheson et al. (2006)
Diazepam

0

0

Acheson et al. (2007)
Sleep Deprivation

.27

-.55

Reynolds et al. (2006)
High dose alcohol
Low dose alcohol

18.33
1.67

.01
.05

Shiels et al. (2009)
High dose MPH
Low dose MPH

.31
.25

0
0

Another benefit of the EDT is that at least one study suggests it better
differentiates those who will succeed in drug-treatment from those who will not.
Krishnan-Sarin et al. (2007) reported that adolescent smokers who discounted less steeply
in the EDT were more likely to be abstinent at the end of a smoking-cessation treatment
interval. A hypothetical-rewards DDT failed to differentiate between these treatmentseeking smokers.
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Because the EDT has proven to be convenient, sensitive to acute experimental
manipulations, predictive of a treatment outcome, and differentiates addicted from
control samples (Fields, Collins, Leraas, & Reynolds, 2009; Reynolds, 2006) the EDT (or
a similar procedure) has been used as a measure of delay discounting in several research
laboratories in the US and UK.
Unique Characteristics of the EDT
The EDT contains three procedural components that differ from commonly used
DDTs. To better understand the apparent benefits of the EDT, we describe and consider
the pros and cons of each of these unique procedural characteristics in the sections that
follow.

Delayed-Probabilistic Rewards
Reynolds (2006) noted that in extra-laboratory contexts delayed rewards are often
probabilistic. For example, when a trusted friend asks to borrow $100 to be paid back in
one year, one knows that the probability of receiving nothing in return is greater than
zero. Likewise, in the natural environment of nonhumans, delayed rewards may never
come to fruition if any of a number of interruptions comes to pass (Stevens & Stephens,
2010). For example, the LL reward may be consumed by a conspecific or the organism
awaiting the LL may be consumed by a predator. To model this, following the delay
interval, the EDT delivers the LL reward with a probability of .35.
Introducing probabilistic outcomes in a discounting task is potentially problematic
if one is interested in quantifying delay discounting. To address this, Reynolds and
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Schiffbauer (2004) suggested that the probabilistic-reward effect could be removed from
EDT measures of delay discounting through a normalization procedure. Specifically, in
one condition of the EDT participants choose between a smaller-certain and a largerprobabilistic reward (p = .35). The subjective value of the probabilistic reward (i.e., the
indifference point) in this condition is then used as the normalized value of the
probabilistic LL rewards arranged in the other EDT conditions.
The EDT’s normalization technique assumes that the effect of probability on
reward value is constant across the range of delays arranged in the EDT (0-60 s). Such an
assumption is consistent with the hypothesis that delay- and probability-discounting are a
single process. For example, Rachlin, Logue, Gibbon, and Frankel (1986) suggested that
delay discounting is the fundamental process underlying probability discounting because
decreasing the probability of obtaining a reward in a repeated gambles experiment
increases the average delay to collection (see also Rachlin et al., 1991). Consistent with
this, Yi, Piedad, and Bickel (2006) found that a single hyperbolic discounting function
could be fit to indifference points when the rewards were both delayed and probabilistic.
However, the delays employed in the Yi et al., experiment were not within the range of
delays arranged in the EDT and the Yi et al., delays and probabilities (and rewards) were
hypothetical rather than experienced, as they are in the EDT. Thus, the assumption that
using a probabilistic LL reward in the EDT does not affect the estimate of delay
discounting has not yet been established. Because a considerable amount of evidence
suggests that delay and probability discounting are separate processes (Estle, Green,
Myerson, & Holt, 2006; Estle, Green, Myerson, & Holt, 2007; Myerson, Green, &
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Morris, 2011; Ostaszewski, Green, & Myerson, 1998) there is reason to question this
assumption.
Opportunity Costs
Reynolds (2006) argued that outside the laboratory, choosing a LL reward often
involves opportunity costs; that is, time spent waiting for the LL reward is time in which
other (SS) rewards may not be pursued. For example, amusement park rides differ in
quality and in the time that must be spent waiting in line to access the ride. If one is
waiting in a long line, the opportunity cost is the cumulative benefits that could have been
obtained by riding several lower quality rides. To model these costs, sequential choices in
the EDT are not separated by a post-reward ITI. Thus, participants may obtain several SS
rewards in the period required to obtain a single LL reward.
If the EDT is being used as a tool to quantify delay discounting (e.g., KrishnanSarin et al., 2007) then omitting the ITI may raise concerns. When real rewards and real
delays are employed in non-EDT studies of delay discounting (most of which involve
animals and food rewards), a post-reward ITI is almost always programmed (e.g.,
Evenden & Ryan, 1996; Mazur, 1988; Richards, Mitchell, de Wit, & Seiden, 1997). The
duration of the ITI in these experiments is dynamic such that the interval between choice
opportunities is constant regardless of the alternative chosen. If the ITI were omitted,
then the organism could select and obtain several SS rewards in the time it takes to obtain
a single LL reward. Such choices could not be described as ―impulsive‖ (i.e., a
maladaptive choice) if they allow the organism to maximize local and overall rates of
reward (Logue, Peña-Correal, Rodriguez, & Kabela, 1986).
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Omitting ITI’s complicates estimation of the discounted value of the LL reward.
In a nonhuman DDT, when the organism is indifferent between a single SS and a LL
reward, the value of the latter is the former. However, if multiple SS rewards are obtained
during the delay (as in the EDT), then at indifference how should the discounted value of
the LL reward be quantified? It might be the sum the SS rewards or the sum of the
discounted values of each SS reward in the sequence separating LL rewards (Mazur,
1986). The EDT takes neither approach. Instead, the average SS reward value over the
last six choices is taken as the discounted value of the LL reward.
Omitting ITIs may also have the unintended effect of allowing participants to end
more quickly the portion of the EDT that requires sustained attention. EDT sessions are
composed of several trial-blocks with a different delay to the LL reward arranged in each.
The duration of each trial block allows for 20 LL choices to be completed. If fewer than
20 LL choices have been made when the stability criterion is met, then the remainder of
the trial block is spent in a waiting period until the next trial block begins. Under this
arrangement, each SS choice shortens the portion of the session in which participants are
required to pay attention to the task. Given that humans often find operant tasks boring
(Galizio & Buskist, 1988), this escape contingency may increase the probability of SS
choices and contaminate the quantification of delay discounting. Consistent with this
hypothesis, children made more LL choices when an ITI was programmed than when it
was omitted in an EDT-like procedure in which LL rewards were obtained 100% of the
time (Scheres et al., 2006). If this escape contingency increases SS choices, and escape
from an attention-demanding task is a more powerful reinforcer when the participant is
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sleep deprived or intoxicated (Reynolds et al., 2006; Reynolds & Schiffbauer, 2004) then
the steeper EDT discounting functions reported by Reynolds and Schiffbauer (2004) and
Reynolds et al. (2006), respectively, may have more to do with escape-maintained
behavior than to greater impulsive choice.
Point-Delays
Unlike animal studies of delay discounting that involve real delays to real
consumable rewards, the EDT arranges real rewards to real monetary allocations. A
difference between these reward types is that the consumable reward mildly alleviates the
animal’s state of deprivation, whereas the monetary allocation cannot be spent within the
EDT session to alleviate a present need. Hyten, Madden, and Field (1994) referred to the
delay to a non-consumable reward as a ―point delay.‖ Hyten et al. reported that humans
exclusively preferred the LL monetary reward when point delays were in the range used
in the EDT (see also Belke, Pierce, & Powell, 1989; Flora & Pavlik, 1992; Hyten et al.,
1994; Logue, King, Chavarro, & Volpe, 1990; Logue et al., 1986). From the participant’s
perspective, if the SS reward is selected, it is obtained immediately but it cannot be spent
until the session ends and the participant travels to an outlet where goods and services are
sold. If the LL reward is selected, more money is obtained and the delay to spending the
money on something that may be consumed is the same. When Jackson and Hackenberg
(1996) arranged point delays to food rewards, pigeons strongly preferred the LL reward
(see also Hackenberg & Vaidya, 2003). These findings suggest that humans should
exclusively prefer the LL alternative under the point-delays arranged in the EDT.
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Why humans appear to discount monetary rewards across point delays arranged in
the EDT is unclear. Reynolds and Schiffbauer (2004) suggested that arranging
probabilistic rewards engenders delay discounting when point delays are arranged.
However, the normalization process discussed above was supposed to subtract the effects
of reward probability from measures of delay discounting. This inconsistency led us to
question if the EDT measures delay discounting (as suggested by Reynolds &
Schiffbeaur, 2004 and Krishnan-Sarin et al., 2007) or a separate, and potentially
important process.
Does the EDT Assess Delay Discounting? A Literature Review
To objectively evaluate the EDT literature we conducted a systematic review of
the methods and results of all the studies that have used the EDT. All peer reviewed
articles, published prior to December, 2011 that have used the EDT as described by
Reynolds and Schiffbauer (2004) were found via citation webs using ISI Web of Science
and Google Scholar. Tables 2 and 3 show the 13 articles identified. Each study was
evaluated according to several variables we deemed important in assessing trends in
methodology and results in the EDT literature. Cohen’s d effect sizes were calculated for
all studies using means and standard deviations or the reported statistics (Cohen, 1988).
In assessment of whether the EDT assesses delay discounting we will consider
four categories of data presented in Tables 2 and 3. First, and most obvious, measures of
delay discounting obtained from the EDT should be positively correlated with measures
obtained from other well-established DDTs. As shown in the final column of Tables 2
and 3, seven studies reported correlation data, with two reporting significant positive
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correlations (Reynolds, 2006, r = .52; Reynolds et al., 2008, r = .26) and five reporting
no significant correlation. These findings suggest the EDT does not provide a valid
measure of delay discounting.
Second, if the EDT provides a valid measure of delay discounting, then when
indifference points are plotted against the range of point delays at which they are assessed
in the EDT, Equation 1 should provide a good fit of these data. Of the 13 EDT studies
published to date, 5 have reported how well Equation 1 (or any other equation) has fit the
obtained indifference points. Across these five studies the average R2 value was .79; a
value lower than typically reported with either nonhuman (e.g., R2 = .98, Richards et al.,
1997) or human subjects (e.g., R2 > .85, Bickel, Odum, & Madden, 1999; median R2 =
.915, Richards et al., 1999; see also DDT R2 column in Table 2). When interpreting these
R2 values it is important to consider the proportion of participants excluded because of
unsystematic data. In the five EDT studies that reported R2 values, three excluded
between 12.5 and 40% of the participants because of unsystematic data. This is surprising
considering it is rare for researchers to report excluded data from discounting
experiments (e.g., Epstein, Richards, Saad, Paluch, & Roemmich, 2003; Richards et al.,
1999). Thus, on this second category by which the validity of the task may be evaluated,
the evidence does not strongly support the position that the EDT measures the same delay
discounting as other DDTs.

Table 2
Summary of EDT Studies That Have Examined an Experimental Manipulation
Study

Subjects

Independent Variable

Acheson et al. (2006)

18 community
(18-45y)

Diazepam (20 mg)

Acheson et al. (2007)

20 community
(18-45y)
24 community
(av 25 y)

Sleep deprivation

Reynolds et al. (2006)

Reynolds & Schiffbauer
(2004)
Shiels et al. (2009)

Voon et al. (2010)

c

Alcohol

Time between
assessments
> 1 week
(random order)

EDT Exclusion
Criteria

Percent (n)
excluded

1 week
(counterbalanced)
> 1 week
(counterbalanced)

"poor fits" in both
sessions
k not determined

40% (8)

.7 (.45)

.5 (1.19)

0.27

-0.55
NS (rho)a

.71 (.2) .83 (.188)

High Dose (.4 g/kg)

18.33b

0.01

Low Dose (.8 g/kg)

1.67

0.04

12
undergraduates
(18-23 y)

Sleep deprivation

1 week
(counterbalanced)

49 children with
ADHD (9-12 y)

M ethylphenidate

24 hrs (random
order)

44 NIH clinic
(with
parkinsons, and
with ICD)

12.5% (9)

DDT
EDT/DDT
EDT R2 DDT R2 EDT Effect
Size
Effect Size Correlation
M (SD) M (SD)
.75 (.06) .8 (.23)
0
0

EDT R2 < .30

27 % (3)

.68 (.24)

0.65b

a

NS

High Dose (Av 39mg)

0.31b

0

Low Dose (Av 73 mg)

0.25

b

0

Dopamine agonist (161,
155 LEDD mg/day)

> 1 week

.7 (.25)

0.92b
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A dash indicates that the data were not reported. Except where otherwise specified, when a delay discounting task was used it was that described by Richards et al. (1999)
a
Statistics not reported.
b
Statistically significant difference according to reported inferential statistics.
c
M odified Barkley et al. (2001)
LEDD = L-Dopa Equivalent Daily Dose.

Table 3
Summary EDT Studies That Have Examined Group Differences

14
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Third, an extensive body of research has demonstrated that substance-dependent
individuals tend to more steeply discount delayed monetary rewards than matched
controls (see MacKillop, Amlung, Few, Ray, Sweet, & Munafò, 2011 for a review). If the
EDT measures delay discounting, then we would expect it to differentiate these
populations in the same direction and by the same magnitude (i.e., co-variance of effect
size). Those studies for which co-variance may be assessed are those in which substance
dependent and matched control groups completed the EDT and the DDT (Table 2). For
ease of comparison, effects sizes are displayed in Table 4. There is no clear relation
between the effect sizes of the two measures across these experiments. Additional data
are required to make a more definitive statement in either direction.

Table 4
EDT and DDT Effect Size Comparison for Group Differences

EDT

DDT

5.00

-1

Melanko et al. (2009)

.53

.44

Paloyelis et al. (2010)

.32

.61

Krishnan-Sarin et al. (2007)

Finally, traditional measures of delay discounting used with humans suggest that
discounting rate is stable across retesting intervals ranging from 1 week to 1 year (Kirby,
2009; Ohmura, Takahashi, Kitamura, & Wehr, 2006; Simpson & Vuchinich, 2000). If the
EDT provides a valid measure of delay discounting then one would expect EDT
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outcomes to be similarly stable over time. To date, only one study has assessed the testretest reliability of the EDT. Acheson, Richards, and de Wit (2007) asked 20 community
members to complete the EDT in the morning and return to the lab approximately 10
hours later to complete it again. No significant difference in rate of discounting was
detected. Clearly, the test-retest validity of the EDT must be assessed across longer
intervening periods so as to decrease concerns that participants’ choices during the
afternoon EDT session were influenced by choices made in the morning.
In sum, these four categories of data provide very limited support for the EDT as
a valid measure of delay discounting. The correlation between traditional delaydiscounting task performance and discounting under the EDT is most often not observed.
EDT indifference points are not as well described by Equation 1 as data from a
hypothetical-reward DDT, and the co-variance of performance in the EDT and DDT by
different populations has yet to be definitively established. Finally more data are needed
to determine if EDT performance is reliable across time and repeated testing.
So, What Does the EDT Measure?
Given the limited data for the EDT as a valid measure of delay discounting, are
there reasons to continue using it? As noted above, the EDT appears to be more sensitive
to acute experimental manipulations than is the DDT. Of course this is useful only if we
understand what the EDT measures. In addition, a small literature suggests the EDT
differentiates groups (Table 3) and, in at least one study, predicts treatment success
(Krishnan-Sarin et al., 2007). Should additional studies demonstrate that EDT
performance is correlated with addictive behavior and success in treatment, a greater
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premium would be placed on understanding what behavioral process is quantified by the
EDT.
One possibility is that the EDT provides a measure of sensitivity to delays
involving opportunity costs (Reynolds, 2006). Most delay discounting tasks used with
humans arrange long delays to hypothetical rewards (e.g., $100 in 1 year) and the
participant is free to pursue other sources of the same reward during the delay. Human
choice may be sensitive to the brief delays arranged in the EDT because these delays
involve forgoing SS reward opportunities. Reynolds (2006) reported that participants
who reported a stronger motivation to earn money were more likely to choose the SS
reward; thereby suggesting a role for opportunity costs.
A second, related possibility is that EDT choices may be affected by a
participant’s willingness to tolerate a period devoid of stimulation (i.e., the delay to the
LL reward). Individuals prone to boredom or less able to entertain themselves during
stimulus-free periods may be more likely to choose the SS alternative. Likewise, a
subject wishing to escape from the attention-demanding portion of the EDT session may
learn that the waiting period that follows all choices made within a block of trials
(leisure) may be produced more quickly by frequently choosing the SS reward.
A third possibility is that the EDT measures sensitivity to an internality of the task
that some participants detect and exploit while others do not. Specifically, rewards on the
LL alternative are probabilistic with an expected value less than 11 cents. Given this,
participants should never choose the LL when the SS amount is above 11 cents.
However, participants frequently do. This may reveal a strategy of exploiting the
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internality – by repeatedly choosing the LL reward the SS amount is driven up. Detecting
this, some participants may increase the SS amount to a value far higher than its
discounted value so they may obtain a series of large-certain rewards. Heyman and Dunn
(2002) arranged a procedure containing a similar internality. Choosing the right-now best
alternative decreased overall income by gradually increasing the interval between choice
opportunities, whereas choosing the worse right-now alternative had the opposite effect
on inter-choice intervals. Heyman and Dunn reported that years of drug use was
negatively correlated with global maximizing. Perhaps the EDT measures one’s ability to
exploit the EDT’s internality and maximize total earnings. This may account for the
correlation between steep EDT discounting (a failure to exploit the internality) and
substance abuse. Likewise, acute experimental manipulations like intoxication or sleep
deprivation may decrease one’s ability to exploit (or detect) the internality.
Conclusion
Delay discounting is of societal importance because of the relation between steep
discounting and a variety of impulse-control disorders. There has been growing interest
in the discounting community in an experiential task that is sensitive to acute changes in
discounting and the EDT has, thus far, captured most of this attention. Since its
development, the EDT has been used to study state changes (e.g., alcohol administration)
as well as group differences (e.g., smokers v. nonsmokers) in rates of delay discounting
in humans. A review of the EDT procedures and a critical examination of EDT and other
discounting-task outcomes offers inadequate support for the validity of the EDT as a
measure of delay discounting. Based on the extant use of the EDT as a measure of delay
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discounting and the paucity of basic validation research, the current report investigated
the reliability and validity of the EDT by assessing test-retest reliability, evaluating
performance on several secondary measures (including a DDT), and evaluating the
effects of the implementation of a choice-regulating delay (i.e., ITI).
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CHAPTER II
METHOD
Experiment 1: Test-Retest Reliability
Participants
Twenty-nine undergraduate students and community members (18 female)
participated in Experiment 1 (M = 21 years, SD = 2.9). Participants were recruited for the
two 1-hour sessions (separated by 7 days) using the SONA recruiting website.
Participants were compensated between $7 and $15 (amount dependent upon
performance) for each session. Compensation was given following all behavioral and
self-report tasks at the end of each session. All procedures were approved by the Utah
State University Institutional Review Board (IRB).
Procedure & Apparatus
Sessions were completed in a small room (113‖ x 79.5‖) containing two tables,
one chair, and a desktop computer. Participants completed four different behavioral and
self-report tasks in both sessions. Sessions began with either the Experiential Discounting
Task (EDT) or the delay/probability discounting tasks (DDT/PDT); the order in which
these tasks were completed was counterbalanced across participants and was the same
across sessions. These tasks were completed on the computer using applications
programmed in Visual Basic 2008. The remaining tasks were paper and pencil
questionnaires and were completed in a fixed order: Boredom Proneness Scale (BPS) and
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Monetary Motivation Scale (MMS). At the completion of the entire session participants
were paid their EDT earnings in cash.
Experiential Discounting Task (EDT). Prior to the EDT session, the
experimenter read the instructions appearing in Appendix A. The experimenter remained
in the room to provide standard answers (see Appendix B) to questions arising as the
participant completed one practice trial block (ranging from 16 to 40 trials) for which
they received no money. Each trial began with the screen display shown in Figure 2.
Choices were made by pressing one of the on-screen light-bulb buttons. The alternative
on the left is referred to as the standard alternative because it always arranged a $0.30
reward (displayed below the button) delivered probabilistically after a delay. When the
participant pressed the standard-alternative button, the light bulbs darkened (signaling
that further button presses had no programmed consequences), the delay interval was
initiated, after which the reward was either available (p = .35) or the next trial began with
the illumination of the light bulbs. When a reward was available, the bank icon button
was illuminated; clicking this button once added $0.30 to the earnings display.
The right button is referred to as the adjusting alternative because the amount
available for pressing this button was adjusted between trials dependent on the
participant’s choices. Pressing the adjusting-alternative button illuminated the bank icon
immediately (p = 1.0). Pressing the bank icon added the adjusting amount of money
(displayed below the right button) to the earnings display. This sequence of events was
programmed to operate exactly as described by Reynolds and Schiffbauer (2004).
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Figure 2. Screen shot of the Experiential Discounting Task.
After the practice trials the experimenter provided a final opportunity for the
participant to ask questions and then left the room until the EDT was completed. The
EDT was composed of 4 trial-blocks, each arranging a different delay to the standardalternative (0, 7, 14, or 28 seconds); delays were completed in ascending order.
Each trial-block included a minimum of 16 choice trials. Following each trial the
monetary amount displayed below the adjusting-alternative was increased (decreased) if
the participant selected the standard (adjusting) alternative on the preceding trial. The
amount of the adjustment was initially 15% of the $0.15 adjusting amount ($0.0225;
rounded to the nearest penny on the visual display). If the same alternative was chosen on
two consecutive trials the amount of the adjustment decreased by 2% (13% of $0.15;
$0.0195). If the participant then chose the previously dis-preferred alternative, the
adjustment increased by 2% until the adjusted amount returned to $0.15 (and adjustment
percentage to 15%). In this way, the adjusting amount adjusted symmetrically away from,
and back to, the original $0.15. Figure 3 displays how the adjusting amount changes
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given SS (negative x-axis values) or LL (positive x-axis values) choice for any point in
the session (any value of the SS). In addition, Figure 3 shows that if the participant
exclusively selects the LL throughout the session the SS amount increases by a
decreasing percentage following each successive choice (producing a positively
decelerating function to the right of 0 on the x-axis). Conversely, if exclusive SS
preference is demonstrated, the amount of the SS decreases by a decreasing percentage
(producing a negatively decelerating function to the left of 0 on the x-axis). If one
alternative was selected four consecutive times, participants were forced to select the dispreferred alternative (i.e., only one choice button was presented). The adjusting amount
in the EDT was titrated following forced choices (based on the EDT program provided by
Reynolds’ lab).
This titration procedure was designed to find a stable point of indifference
between the adjusting (SS) and standard (LL) amounts. Stability was evaluated following
trial 16 and after each subsequent free choice. Stability was defined as three of the
previous six free choices were for the standard alternative. When stability was achieved
all buttons were darkened for the remainder of the programmed trial-block duration. The
duration of each trial block was equal to the delay to the standard alternative (e.g., 30 s)
times 20 (e.g., 600 s). The timer controlling trial-block duration elapsed only during
delays to the standard alternative. If the participant reached stability before making 20 LL
choices, they spent the remainder of the time with the buttons darkened (signally that no
options were available). If participants made 20 or more LL choices, trial blocks were
terminated immediately. After each trial block a message informed participants how
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much they earned in that trial block and required them to press ―OK‖ to continue.
Following the last trial block (including time-out period) an on-screen message showed
the amount earned in each trial block, the total amount earned in the session, and a
message to alert the researcher that the session was over.
Delay and Probability Discounting Task (DDT/PDT). The discounting task
replicated the procedures used by Richards et al. (1999; see also Baker, Johnson, &
Bickel, 2003). This was the most commonly used procedure in studies comparing EDT,
DDT, and PDT performance, as well as the task used when a positive relation was found
between EDT and DDT performance (e.g., Acheson et al., 2006, 2007; Melanko, Leraas,
Collins, Fields, & Reynolds, 2009; Paloyelis et al., 2010; Reynolds, 2006; Reynolds, et
al., 2006, 2008). Before the task began the experimenter read aloud the on-screen
instructions and answered participant questions (Appendix C). The participant was then
left alone to complete the task. On each trial, the participant chose one of two alternatives
presented on the computer screen. On DDT trials, the standard alternative was described
as $10 to be delivered after a delay (1 day, 2 days, 1 month, 6 months and 1 year). On
PDT trials, the standard alternative was described as $10 delivered probabilistically (for
sure, 90%, 75%, 50% or 25%). The standard alternative was presented on the left side of
the screen on all trials. DDT and PDT trials were presented randomly and trials were
separated by one second.
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Figure 3. Plot of the changing SS amount as a function of choice. Movement right along
the x-axis depicts LL choices and movement left indicates SS choices. Note that due to
the adjusting algorithm a participant can move left or right along the curve in any way.
The limits of the x-axis denote when the trial-block is ended due to the SS amount
reaching $0.30 or $0.00. The horizontal line at .105 is the expected value of the LL
amount (.30 × .35). The dashed line is the obtained SS amount given forced choices. The
solid line is the best-fitting sigmoidal function.

The amount of the adjusting alternative (SS or smaller-certain reward) was
displayed in $0.50 increments. On any given trial the amount of the adjusting alternative
was randomly chosen from a range of values. The upper and lower limits of this range
were adjusted between trials. Four limits (2 upper and 2 lower) were used in this ―doublelimit‖ procedure. The maximum-upper limit and minimum-upper limit began at $10. The
maximum-lower limit and minimum-lower limits began at $0. Thereafter, at a particular

26
delay (probability) the limits were adjusted, based on participant choices, according to the
following rules:
1. If the standard alternative was chosen:
a. If the SS was greater than the minimum-upper limit, then this limit
was set equal to the SS, and the maximum-upper limit was reset to $10
(this choice is inconsistent with a previous choice).
b. If the SS was greater than the minimum-lower limit and less than the
minimum-upper limit, the minimum-lower limit was set equal to the
SS and the maximum-lower limit was set equal to the previous
minimum-lower limit (all other values were unchanged).
c. If the SS was less than the minimum-lower limit, then the maximumlower limit was set equal to the SS amount.
2. If the SS alternative was chosen:
a. If the SS was greater than the minimum-upper limit, then the
maximum-upper limit was set to the SS amount.
b. If the SS was less than the minimum-upper limit and greater than the
minimum-lower limit, then the minimum-upper limit was set equal to
the SS amount and the maximum-upper limit was set to the previous
minimum-upper limit (all other values remained unchanged).
c. If the SS was less than the minimum-lower limit, then the minimumlower limit was set equal to the SS amount and the maximum-lower
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limit is reset to $0.00 (this choice is inconsistent with a previous
choice).
The limits (for each delay and probability) adjusted until the maximum-upper and
maximum-lower limits (the two extremes) were within $0.50, the average of which was
then taken as the indifference point. When an indifference point had been determined at a
given delay (or probability), choices were no longer presented from that delay (or
probability). In order to disguise the adjustment algorithm, after 70 choices were made
half of the questions were distractor questions. Distractor questions consisted of
randomly chosen amounts, delays or probabilities and did not affect indifference points.
Boredom Proneness Scale (BPS). The BPS is a 28-item true/false questionnaire
that measures propensity toward boredom and need for stimulation (Farmer & Sundberg,
1986; Appendix D). The BPS has good internal consistency and test-retest reliability
(Farmer & Sundberg, 1986; Watt & Davis, 1991). We used a 7-point Likert-scaled
version of the BPS as this increases the sensitivity of the scale without loss of reliability
(Vodanovich & Kass, 1990; Watt & Blanchard, 1994; Watt & Ewing, 1996). Vodanovich
and Kass reported that BPS items clustered into 5 factors (see Table 5): external
stimulation (the environment lacks variety), internal stimulation (the inability to entertain
oneself produces boredom), perception of time (boredom occurs because time is
perceived to pass slowly), constraint (the inability to do what one wishes, or the
obligation to do something one does not wish to do), and affective responses (emotional
responses to the environment).
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Table 5
Factors of the Boredom Proneness Scale

Factor

Items

External Stimulation
Internal Stimulation
Perception of time
Constraint
Affective Responses

6, 19-21, 25-28
7, 8, 11, 13, 18, 22-24
3, 4, 14, 16
15, 17
2, 4, 5, 9, 11, 12

Monetary Motivation Scale (MMS). The MMS is a 2-item paper-and-pencil
questionnaire designed to assess participants’ current motivation to earn small amounts of
money (see Appendix E).
Data Analysis
The indifference point for each trial block in the EDT was the average adjusting
amount over the last six choices. Indifference points from all trial blocks of the EDT were
normalized by dividing by the indifference point in the 0-s delay block (Reynolds &
Schiffbauer, 2004). For the DDT and PDT, indifference points were the average of the
maximum-upper limit and maximum-lower limit from each delay and probability value
and then divided by $10 to express as a proportion of the standard alternative.
Normalized and proportional indifference points were then fit with Equation 1 to
determine best-fitting k-values for individual participants in each task. In addition, the
area under the empirically determined indifference points was calculated for individual
participants (AUC; Myerson, Green, & Warusawitharana, 2001). AUC is a theory-free
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method of quantifying rate of delay discounting and can range from 0 (strict preference
for smaller rewards) to 1 (rewards are not devalued regardless of delay).
Several dependent measures deviated significantly from normality. Logarithmic
and square root transformations failed to improve the distribution for a majority of the
dependent measures. Therefore nonparametric difference tests were used.
Test-retest Reliability. Correlational analyses were conducted between all
dependent measures (between sessions) using either Pearson or Spearman’s correlation.
Pearson’s r was used unless the distribution of scores violated homoscedasticity, in which
case Spearman’s ρ was calculated. Correlation coefficients are the recommended method
for analyzing test-retest data, with follow-up tests to assess systematic variation that
cannot be detected by correlations (Rousson, Gasser, & Burkhardt, 2002). Wilcoxon
signed-rank tests were conducted to test for differences in performance between sessions
one and two for all dependent measures as well as Cohen’s d, a measure of effect size
that expresses mean-differences in standard deviation units. Analyses were conducted
using GraphPad software (Ver. 5.01) and SPSS 19.
Between-Measure Correlations. Summed BPS scores, separate BPS factor
scores, and summed MMS scores were correlated with the discounting measures
produced by the EDT, DDT, and PDT. Pearson’s r was calculated except when there
were significant violations of homoscedasticity in which case Spearman’s ρ was
calculated. For the MMS, items were quantified as distance from the left (in centimeters),
with a lower bound of .01 and upper bound of 16.1. Item 2 was reverse coded, then
averaged with item 1.
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Experiment 2: Inter-Trial Interval
Participants
Twenty undergraduate students and community members (15 female) participated
in Experiment 2 (M = 21.8 years, SD = 3). As in Experiment 1, participants were
recruited via an online recruiting website (SONA). Participants signed up for one 90
minute session and were informed they would be compensated $15-$40 in cash at the
conclusion of the session (amount dependent on performance). All procedures and
recruitment materials were approved by the Utah State University IRB.
Procedure
The procedures were identical to those used in Experiment 1 except that
participants also completed a modified version of the EDT (EDTmod). The EDTmod was
identical to the EDT except that an ITI was imposed following trials on which the
adjusting alternative (SS reward) was selected. The duration of the ITI was equal to the
duration of the delay interval experienced after choosing the standard alternative. The ITI
ensured that the time between choice opportunities was constant within a trial block,
regardless of the alternative chosen. The ITIs imposed in the EDTmod took the place of
the period of time during which participants were not allowed to make any responses at
the conclusion of each trial block. The order of EDT and EDTmod was counterbalanced
across participants. Between EDT tasks, participants completed the DDT/PDT, BPS and
MMS (in that order).
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Data Analysis
All data were analyzed as in Experiment 1 with the exception of a second
session’s data for the DDT/PDT, MMS and BPS. All analyses were conducted using
GraphPad software (Ver. 5.01) and SPSS 19 as in Experiment 1.
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CHAPTER III
RESULTS
Experiment 1: Test-Retest Reliability
Two participants did not complete the second session and data from one
participant was lost due to computer malfunction. Therefore data are reported for 16
individuals. Table 6 shows individual participant’s k and R2 values obtained when
indifference points were fit with Equation 1. Median individual fits for the DDT and PDT
were greater than EDT fits (.84 and .94 compared to .49). A Friedman’s test comparing
R2 values across tasks revealed a significant main effect (χ2(3)) = 35.08, p < .0001).
Dunn’s multiple comparison analysis revealed significant differences in R2 values
between the EDT and PDT (p < .05), and DDT and PDT (p < .05). The low R2 values in
the EDT may be an artifact of shallow discounting (i.e., little variance in y to be
accounted for by x). Inconsistent with this hypothesis, an ANOVA comparing mean
square error (a measure of the deviation from the best-fitting curve) revealed no
significant difference across the three tasks or the two sessions (F(5) = 1.307, p = .26).
That is, the difference in R2 values across tasks cannot be due to differences in steepness
of discounting.
Test-Retest Reliability
Individual participants’ data for all dependent measures are shown in Figure 4. As
shown in Table 7, between-session test-retest correlations were positive and significant
except for EDT and PDT AUC scores, which achieved only a trend level of significance.

33

Table 6
Individual Best-Fitting k Parameters (and R2 Values) From Experiment 1
EDT

DDT

PDT

ID

Session 1

Session 2

Session 1

Session 2

Session 1

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

.01 (-)
.04 (.19)
.01 (-)
.52 (.46)
.17 (.85)
1.5 (.11)
.01 (.92)
2.1 (.95)
.48 (.95)
1.5 (.52)
.12 (.22)
3.2 (.99)
.34 (.63)
.47 (.98)
.13 (-)
.05 (.70)
.13 (-)
.11 (.06)
.13 (.57)
.19 (.38)
.83 (.87)
.58 (.54)
.10 (-)
.28 (.80)
5.0 (.88)
.40 (.80)

.01 (.68)
0 (0)
.59 (.42)
.06 (.01)
.03 (.66)
.63 (-)
.51 (.52)
2.0 (.94)
1.0 (.21)
1.3 (.17)
.62 (.10)
.74 (.79)
.09 (.29)
.55 (.90)
.04 (-)
.09 (-)
-.47 (-)
3.2 (.93)
-.07 (-)
.22 (-)
1.1 (.99)
.74 (.53)
.24 (.54)
.05 (-)
4.0 (.87)
-.01 (-)

18 (.94)
88 (.46)
.52 (.30)
24 (-)
.43 (.14)
11457 (0)
2.0 (.43)
.15 (-)
2.3 (.98)
43 (.93)
3.1 (.97)
.39 (.23)
1.2 (.19)
.45 (.92)
.51 (-)
.03 (0)
.17 (.10)
.79 (.89)
.46 (.77)
2.6 (.87)
.59 (.87)
23 (.98)
33 (.97)
.39 (-)
6.0 (.97)
1.3 (.97)

41 (.97)
37 (.91)
.33 (.72)
45 (.91)
1.6 (.95)
11457 (0)
.80 (-)
.17 (.73)
6.5 (.89)
49 (.95)
1.3 (.69)
3.8 (.97)
.15 (.82)
.51 (.97)
.32 (-)
.57 (.49)
.08 (.14)
1.1 (.94)
1.2 (.93)
3.1 (-)
.15 (.82)
38 (.93)
31 (.97)
.40 (.93)
13 (.98)
.58 (.92)

.36 (.97)
.27 (.98)
1.2 (.84)
1.1 (.65)
.21 (.99)
1.1 (.89)
.26 (.99)
.81 (.82)
.65 (.99)
.89 (.89)
3602 (.99) 23520(.96)
1.2 (.91)
.77 (.68)
1.6 (.94)
.70 (.77)
1.2 (.90)
3.2 (.77)
3.5 (.81)
.16 (.96)
.13 (.99)
.10 (.99)
.10 (.99)
.26 (.98)
.17 (.90)
2.7 (.93)
2.2 (.69)
4.2 (.67)
1.7 (.90)
.46 (.96)
1.3 (.93)
.64 (.95)
.34 (.78)
.22 (.96)
1.1 (.95)
.60 (.98)
.54 (.95)
.43 (.95)
.42 (.85)
.63 (.81)
.44 (.97)
1.4 (.92)
.56 (.98)
.74 (.98)
20 (.87)
7.0 (.74)
.20 (.95)
.09 (.97)
.98 (.91)
1.4 (.94)
.46 (.97)
.83 (.83)

Median:

.2617 (.49)

1.271 (.84)

Session 2

.7532 (.94)

Note. R2 values of 0 or marked as (-) were treated the same (as zeros), and this did not
affect medians nor Freidman’s test.
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Table 7
Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Tests and Correlation Coefficients for Between Session
Differences in Experiment 1

Rank differences

EDT (AUC)
EDT k
DDT (AUC)
DDT k
PDT (AUC)
PDT k
BPS
MMS

Session 1
M (SD)

Session 2
M (SD)

W

p

d

.82 (.19)
.70 (1.1)
.56 (.29)
459 (2244)
.41 (.13)
140 (706)
94 (19)
9.3 (4.8)

.88 (.26)
.65 (.97)
.53 (.33)
467 (2243)
.47 (.15)
910 (4632)
94 (17)
8.2 (4.3)

-117
51
43
-89
-143
-49
4
141

.14
.52
.57
.23
.07
.54
.96
.06

.27
-.05
-.10
.004
.41
.29
.02
-.24

Correlation
ρ/r
.32
.66
.86
.78
.38
.52
.89
.73

p
.06
<.01
<.01
<.01
.06
<.01
<.01
<.01

Note. n = 26. Bold indicates that Spearman’s ρ was used.
In addition, the Wilcoxon’s rank differences tests revealed no statistically significant
differences between matched pairs (i.e., across sessions) for any dependent measures,
indicating no systematic change in performance across sessions.
As seen in Table 6, 14 of the 52 EDT R2 values were < 0, meaning that a
horizontal line at the mean of the indifference points accounts for as much as, or more, of
the variance than the hyperbolic model. Given this, AUC may be more appropriate for
assessing test-retest reliability; however, a limitation of AUC, as described by Myerson et
al. (2001) is that the same AUC can be generated from potentially very different patterns
of indifference points.
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Figure 4. Individual values from each assessment for each session in Experiment 1.
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Figure 5. Median normalized indifference points from the Experiential Discounting Task
in Experiment 1. Error bars depict standard error of the mean (n = 29).

For these reasons, we tested for time effects on normalized or proportional indifference
points using a 2 (session) by 4 (indifference point) repeated measures ANOVA. The
Greenhouse-Geisser correction on degrees of freedom was used when there were
violations of sphericity. Figure 5 shows normalized indifference points as a function of
delay in the two EDT sessions. There was a significant main effect of delay (F(2.029) =
7.8, p < .001), no main effect of session (F(1) = 1.391, p = .249), and no session by delay
interaction (F(3) = 1.1, p = .352). Delay and probability task indifference points are
shown in Figure 6. For the DDT there was a significant main effect of delay (F(1.605) =
.89, p < .001), no main effect of session (F(1) = .989, p = .33), and no interaction
(F(2.698) = .89, p = .44). For PDT there was a main effect of probability (F(2.2) =
180.346, p < .001) no main effect of session (F(1) = 2.067, p = .163), but there was a
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marginally significant interaction (F(4) = 2.609, p = .056). Though there was a
marginally significant interaction, θ-values did not differ significantly between sessions
(W = -49, p = .54).

Figure 6. Delay (top) and probability discounting group median indifference functions in
Experiment 1. Error bars depict standard error of the mean.
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Covariance of Dependent Measures
As no statistically significant differences were detected across sessions, data were
averaged across sessions for the remaining analyses. Table 8 shows the correlation matrix
among AUC values generated by the EDT, DDT, and PDT; it also shows correlations
between these measures and the BPS and MMS. The only significant correlation was a
positive relation between DDT and PDT AUC values. Thus, those who steeply
discounted delayed rewards also tended to be risk averse. Importantly, AUC from the
EDT and DDT were not significantly correlated, suggesting that the two tasks measure
different processes.
Table 8
Correlation Matrix for Dependent Measures in Experiment 1

1
1. EDT AUC
2. DDT AUC
3. PDT AUC
4. BPS
5. MMS

1
.01
.21
-.01
-.34

2

3

1
.41*
-.08
.39

1
.19
-.09

4

1
.13

5

M

SD

1

.85
.55
.44
94
8.7

.19
.29
.12
17
4.2

Note. n = 26. Because differences between sessions were not detected, data for each
dependent measure were averaged across sessions. Bold indicates Spearman’s ρ was
used. * p < .05.
Experiment 2: Inter-Trial Interval
Table 9 shows k- and R2 values for individual participants across the four tasks in
Experiment 2. Friedman’s test revealed no significant difference across tasks despite the
range of median values (.44 for EDTmod to .88 for PDT; Table 9; χ2(3)) = 0.33, p =.85).
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In addition, no differences in deviation from the hyperbolic curve were detected (mean
square error; F(3) = .3382, p = .80).
The primary question of Experiment 2 was whether the addition of an ITI would
systematically affect choice. The median of all participants’ indifference points for the
EDT and EDTmod are shown in Figure 7. A matched-pairs t test revealed no significant
effect of adding an ITI regardless of whether AUC or k-value was used to quantify
discounting (t = .86, p = .40; t = .97, p = .34, respectively). A 2 (task) by 4 (delay)
repeated measures ANOVA using individual indifference points revealed no main effect
of delay (F(3) = 1.641, p = .19), task (F(1) = .526, p = .477) nor interaction (F(3) = .646,
p = .588).
As in Experiment 1, correlation coefficients were calculated using either
Pearson’s r or Spearman’s ρ and these are reported in Table 10. The correlations between
discounting measures across the two EDT tasks were not statistically significant. Upon
further examination of the data there was one outlier, with an AUC value from the EDT
session of 1.68 and only .78 in the EDTmod. AUC values exceeding 1 are possible in the
EDT because indifference points are normalized to the indifference point obtained in the
first trial block (0-s delay). If indifference points in subsequent trial blocks exceed this
first indifference point, AUC may be > 1. Excluding this participant produced a strong,
positive correlation between EDT tasks regardless of the way in which discounting was
quantified (AUC r = .74, p < .01; k-value r = .90, p < .01). The BPS was negatively
correlated with EDT AUC indicating that individuals who are less prone to boredom
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discount less steeply in the EDT. The MMS did not significantly correlate with any
dependent measure.

Table 9
Individual Best-Fitting k Parameters (and R2 Values) From Experiment 2
ID

EDT

EDTmod

DDT

PDT

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

.28 (.01)
-.01 (.88)
.93 (.51)
-.04 (.08)
.39 (.07)
.05 (.70)
.06 (.11)
-.73 (.93)
.26 (.54)
.47 (.68)
0 (0)
.80 (.94)
.16 (.84)
.05 (.52)
.22 (.64)
.32 (.86)
0 (0)
-.07 (.26)
14 (.98)
.97 (.11)

.13 (.21)
.05 (-)
.59 (.79)
.14 (.94)
.55 (.78)
.25 (.83)
.16 (.78)
.41 (-)
.06 (.69)
.13 (.35)
0 (0)
.20 (-)
-.01 (-)
.32 (.57)
.53 (.87)
.21 (.53)
0 (0)
.13 (-)
1.8 (.88)
-.16 (-)

257 (.96)
.62 (.59)
.61 (.47)
2.0 (.60)
6.1 (.97)
.54 (.73)
.47 (-)
152 (.96)
.44 (.49)
.36 (.91)
.30 (.15)
10 (.94)
57 (.51)
6.0 (.87)
.22 (.21)
6.3 (-)
.03 (0)
.03 (0)
.03 (0)
39 (.95)

8.0 (.80)
10 (-)
5.1 (.93)
2.2 (.99)
1.6 (.69)
4.0 (.97)
.83 (.62)
48 (.99)
.74 (-)
3.838 (.98)
1.7 (.84)
1.6 (.93)
2.2 (.69)
1.2 (.92)
7.5 (.99)
3.8 (.72)
4.8 (.94)
.08 (.75)
12 (.90)
5.0 (.85)

Median: .14 (.59)

.15 (.44)

.59 (.59)

3.8 (.88)
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Indifference Point

1.1
1.0
0.9
0.8
R2

K

0.7

EDT
Modified EDT

.005
.006

.90
.87

0.6
0

10

20

30

Delay (seconds)
Figure 7. Median normalized indifference points from the EDT in Experiment 2. Error
bars depict standard error of the mean (n = 20).

Table 10
Correlation Matrix and Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Measures in Experiment 2
1
1. EDT auc
2. EDTmod
3. DDT auc
4. PDT auc
5. BPS
6. MMS

2

3

1
.33
1
-.34
-.10 1
-.18
.19
.27
-.45* -.29 .07
-.28 .13
.22

4

1
.37
.34

5

1
-.23

6

M

SD

1

.92
90
.61
.49
82
8.7

.25
.12
.32
.20
16
5.0

Note. n = 20. Only AUC values were used for the discounting assessments. Bold
indicates Spearman’s ρ was used. * p < .05.
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Combined Analyses
Because several of the tasks were identical in both experiments a number of
questions can be addressed using the data from both experiments. Four overall
correlations are of interest: the correlation between discounting as assessed by the EDT
and DDT, how both of these correlate with probability discounting, and how the 0-second
indifference points on the EDT (a putative measure of sensitivity to probability) correlate
with probability discounting. Figure 8 shows the absence of a correlation between AUC
values obtained in the EDT and DDT across both experiments (ρ = .01, p = .94).
We combined the delay and probability discounting data from both experiments
(averaging the values across sessions in Experiment 1). Figure 9 shows that there was a
significant positive correlation between AUC across these two tasks (r = .33, p < .05).
Figure 10 shows that there was no significant correlation between EDT and probability
discounting. Note that there were two participants excluded from this analysis based on a
z-scores greater than 3 (one for EDT AUC, and the other for PDT AUC).
One assumption of the EDT is that the indifference point in the 0-second delay
block is a measure of sensitivity to probability (because the delayed option is
probabilistic). In order to test this assumption, in Figure 11 we assessed the correlation
between the 0-second indifference point in the EDT with AUC from the PDT. Figure 11
reveals a significant positive correlation. Note one participant was excluded as an outlier
(z-score >3) based on PDT AUC.
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2.0

EDT (AUC)

1.5

1.0

0.5

 = .01, p = .94
0.0
0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

DDT (AUC)

Figure 8. Correlation between delay discounting and experiential discounting area under
the curve. Dotted line depicts the best-fitting regression line (n = 46).

Finally, we examined correlations between the three discounting assessments and
the five factors of the BPS (Vodanovich & Kass, 1990). There were no significant
relations between the discounting measures and the BPS items (Table 11).

Figure 9. Correlation between delay discounting and probability discounting area under
the curve. Dotted line depicts the best-fitting regression line (n = 46).
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EDT (AUC)

1.5

1.0

0.5
 = .16
p = .31

0.0
0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

Combined PDT auc
Figure 10. Correlation between experiential discounting and probability discounting area
under the curve. Dotted line depicts the best-fitting regression line (n = 44).

1.0

PDT (AUC)

0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
0.0

r = .40, p = .006
0.1

0.2

0.3

0s indifference point

Figure 11. Correlation between probability discounting AUC and the 0-second
indifference point from the EDT. Indifference points were used from Experiments 1 and
2; Session 1 in Experiment 1 and the EDT from Experiment 2. Dotted line depicts the
best-fitting regression line (n = 45).
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Table 11
Correlations Among BPS Subscales and Experiential, Delay, and Probability
Discounting

External Stimulation
Internal Stimulation
Perception of Time
Constraint
Affective Responses

EDT

DDT

PDT

-.03
-.24
-.25
.07
-.25

.001
.05
.07
-.06
.04

.12
-.09
.02
.001
.09

Note. n = 59

Another Hypothesis
To further investigate the behavioral processes underlying the EDT, we
investigated a model that calculates discounted value for rewards that are both
probabilistic and delayed. Yi et al. (2006) proposed the following equation in which
probability is included in the hyperbolic equation as a cost variable that combines
additively with the delay:

(2)
In Equation 2, R is a scaling parameter for the odds against obtaining the delayed reward
(θ); all other parameters are as in Equation 1. Rachlin et al. (1991) calculated a scaling
parameter for odds against by having participants make decisions about delayed and
probabilistic rewards. In their experiments with human subjects, an R of 35.3 provided
the best between-subjects fit. We used this R-value and Equation 2 to fit non-normalized
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EDT indifference points (data were non-normalized because reward probability was now
included in the discounting equation). At this value of R, Equation 2 provided poor fits
(median R2 = .18; see the frequency distribution in Figure 12). Next we allowed R to vary
between participants and, not surprisingly, obtained better fits (as seen in Figure 12).

20

Frequency

15

R unconstrained
R = 35.3

Median
0.6597
0.1806

10

5

0
0.0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1.0

R-square

Figure 12. Distribution of R2 values from equation 2 based on various constraints of the
parameter R. All negative R2 values are included in the 0 bin.

Using this arrangement of free-parameters, the estimates of k and R putatively
account for individual variation in sensitivity to delay and probability, respectively. With
sensitivity to reward probability removed from the EDT estimate of delay discounting,
one would now expect EDT k-values derived from Equation 2 to correlate with AUC
from the DDT. Figure 13 shows that there was no correlation between the two.
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ρ = -.06
p = 0.65

Figure 13. Correlation between best-fitting k-values when R was unconstrained and delay
discounting AUC.
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CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
The goals of the present set of experiments were to (a) assess the test-retest
reliability of the EDT, (b) determine if adding an ITI to the EDT would systematically
affect choice, and (c) evaluate its validity against a DDT with good test-retest reliability
and internal validity. Experiment 1 demonstrated that the EDT had good test-retest
reliability over a period of seven days. Experiment 2 demonstrated that adding an ITI to
trials in which the SS reward was selected did not affect choices made in the EDT.
The EDT was developed to provide a measure of delay discounting that addresses
concerns about more typical procedures used to assess delay discounting in humans; it
arranges real instead of hypothetical rewards and delays, and estimates discounting from
a stable pattern of choice. As noted earlier, the real rewards arranged in the EDT are
different from those arranged in nonhuman experiments because monetary rewards
cannot be spent (consumed) when delivered. Because previous research with pigeons
(e.g., Hackenberg & Vaidya, 2003) and people (Hyten et al., 1994) suggests delayed nonconsumable rewards are not discounted over the range of delays arranged in the EDT, it
is surprising that delay discounting is observed in the EDT.
The present studies were designed to test one of the procedural concerns
associated with the EDT—the omission of ITIs. Although not using an ITI allows for
opportunity costs of choosing the LL that often occur in our everyday lives, it is difficult
to dissociate the effects produced by opportunity costs versus the effects of the delay.
However, when we imposed an ITI in Experiment 2 we found no change in performance
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from the EDT without ITIs. These data suggest that inclusion of opportunity costs
associated with LL choice is a nonfunctional procedural characteristic of the EDT. Thus,
it appears that the EDT does not capture the effect of opportunity costs.
Does the EDT Assess Delay Discounting?
The present findings reveal (a) DDT and EDT measures of delay discounting
were uncorrelated; (b) the hyperbolic model (Equation 1) provided poorer fits to EDT
than DDT indifference points; (c) EDT choice (like DDT choice) does not systematically
change over a period of 7 days; and (d) when sensitivity to reward probability was
separated from EDT estimates of k, these estimates were not correlated with the DDT
assessment of delay discounting. Together with the literature summarized in the
Introduction, very little evidence supports the EDT as a valid measure of delay
discounting.
What Does the EDT Measure?
Given these findings, what does the EDT measure? Here we will consider four
possibilities. First, the EDT may provide a measure of sensitivity to opportunity costs.
Traditional delay discounting tasks use hypothetical rewards and delays which do not
arrange opportunity costs associated with choosing the delayed reward (i.e., one is free to
pursue other rewards during the delay). By contrast, in the EDT one is unable to obtain
the SS alternative for the duration of the delay to the LL reward. In this way, performance
in the EDT may be determined by one’s sensitivity to opportunity costs. If this is so, then
EDT performance should not be related to a task that assesses the devaluation of a reward
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delayed in time (namely a DDT). Perhaps sensitivity to opportunity costs co-varies with
substance use disorders and may be affected by experimental manipulations such as sleep
deprivation (e.g., Reynolds & Schiffbeaur, 2004) and alcohol (Reynolds et al., 2006).
However, if this were the case, then we should have seen a significant difference in EDT
performance when the ITI was excluded, as in Experiment 2.
Second, the EDT may measure intolerance for periods devoid of stimulation. In
the EDT, one can avoid no-stimulation periods by choosing the SS reward. If this were
the case we would expect BPS scores to negatively correlate with EDT performance. We
did find a negative relation between overall BPS scores and EDT performance in
Experiment 2 indicating that this might be a mechanism behind EDT performance.
However, this relation was not seen when Experiments 1 and 2 were combined. Further
evidence against this hypothesis is that the internal stimulation subscale of the BPS
(inability to entertain oneself) was not significantly correlated with EDT scores. More
data will be needed to further explore this relation.
Third, the EDT may measure subjective perception of the passage of time. If a
participant’s internal clock ran quickly, the delay to the LL reward in the EDT (a delay
actually experienced during the EDT) would be subjectively experienced as longer than
by a participant with a slower clock. The BPS includes a perception of time subscale,
which quantifies the extent which boredom occurs because time is perceived as passing
slowly. However, EDT scores were not correlated with this subscale of the BPS.
Finally, the EDT might be affected by participant’s ability to discriminate and
strategically exploit the EDT’s adjusting-amount algorithm used to determine an
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indifference point (i.e., the internality). In animal adjusting-amount tasks the choice is
between small amounts of food or liquid, each consumed upon delivery. By contrast, in
the EDT, money is accumulated, either on screen or in a glass jar, which may facilitate
discrimination of the algorithm by which the amount of the adjusting alternative changes
depending on choice. Participants who discriminate this algorithm may be more likely to
choose the LL reward in an effort to strategically increase the amount of the SS reward.
This may be followed by a series of choices in which participants ―cash in‖ by repeatedly
choosing the SS (for sure) reward. Figure 3 depicts the adjusting-amount algorithm by
plotting the SS amount (dashed line) as a function of choice. Assuming maximization of
amount, participants should never choose the LL reward when the SS exceeds the
expected value of the larger alternative; i.e., 11 cents. However we often found
indifference points between 21 and 25 cents. If LL choices are made to exploit the
adjusting-amount algorithm and increase the amount of the SS reward, then the slope of
the curve in Figure 3 depicts the decreasing benefit of each additional LL choice (in
increasing the SS amount).
In a procedure designed to test the extent to which individuals exploit an adjusting
algorithm, Heyman and Dunn (2002) reported that in comparison to matched controls,
substance abusers did not learn to exploit the internality. Substance abusers may similarly
not learn to exploit the internality in the EDT causing their performance to be
significantly different from controls (Fields et al., 2009; Meda et al., 2009; Melanko et
al., 2009). Similarly acute effects of sleep deprivation or alcohol may dampen an
individual’s ability to detect and exploit this internality. In order to test this assumption,
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future research should directly compare EDT performance to performance in a task that is
designed to specifically test sensitivity to an internality.
An important further consideration for future research is the experiential nature of
the EDT. That is, how might choice in the EDT be affected if either the delays, rewards
or both were not experienced, but were conveyed verbally? Interestingly, there does not
seem to be a difference in EDT results when the money is delivered via a coin dispenser
immediately when the reward is earned versus when the amount accumulates on-screen
and delivered in one lump sum following completion of the session.
Conclusion
The EDT is a procedurally complicated task in which choices are made between
SS and probabilistic LL rewards. Given the numerous potentially interacting procedural
variables, it is difficult to say what the EDT measures. However, the results of our
experiments provide very limited evidence supporting the contention that the EDT
measures delay discounting.
Because choice in the EDT is sensitive to acute experimental manipulations,
group differences, and may be predictive of drug-taking, it is important to know what the
EDT measures. Future research might benefit from systematically asking participants to
report why they make the choices they make. Such self-reports may provide evidence for
one of the controlling variables discussed above, or they may suggest a new variable that
could be experimentally manipulated in future research.
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APPENDIX A
Experiential Discounting Task Instructions
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“This first portion is a practice portion, you will not receive any money from this portion.
You will receive, in cash, the amount you earn during the portions you complete while I
am out of the room.”
a. Point to the left light bulb and say: “This is the delayed option.”
b. Point to the right light bulb and say: “This is the immediate option.”
c. Point to the Total Amount Area and say: “This is the amount that you will receive in
cash.”
d. Read:
―You will have the opportunity to make multiple choices between a delayed and
probabilistic 30 cents or an adjusting immediate and for sure amount of money to
be deposited into the bank.
… as you are making choices with this task, the adjusting amount will adjust
according to certain rules. For every choice to the delayed 30 cents on the left…
e. Point to the left light bulb and continue:
“…the adjusting amount on the right…
f. Point to the right light bulb and continue:
“…will go up in value for the next choice. For every choice to the adjusting
immediate amount on the right…
g. Point to the right light bulb and continue:
―...the amount on that side will go down in value for the next choice. There are no
right or wrong ways to do this task, just do what you prefer. You will be
completing several portions, all of which will differ in length of time—from short
to long. Proceed through the portions at your own pace. A box will pop up
signaling the end of the task. You will know this is the end because it requires a
password to continue.
At this point, you will signal for me and I will record how much money you have
earned in this task.
h. To demonstrate how the program works, run the practice portion, having the
participant make choices for each option.
i. point out: The bank button must be clicked when it illuminates and that the
amount of money on the right side is adjusting based on the previous choice.
i. Following the completion of the practice session ask the participant if he/she has any
questions. After any questions have been answered, leave the room until they signal for
you to return.
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Answers to Commonly Asked Questions in the EDT
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Commonly asked questions (with responses in italics):
If the participant does not readily click on the bank button when it illuminates.
Response: [point to the bank button] You need to click this to deposit the money into your
bank.
“Why are the buttons not available?”
Response: Sometimes you just need to wait.
“Is it broken?”
(at the end during the long waiting period)
Response: It is working properly, you just have to wait longer sometimes.
(When only one alternative becomes available)
Response: Sometimes this happens, you simply have to choose the available one.
Adjusting amount (confusion or misunderstanding)
Response: (refer to the appropriate sections on the previous page).
“Will I get credit for my psychology course for completing this study?”
Response: No, the only form of compensation is the cash we will pay you at the end of the
session.
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APPENDIX C
Delay and Probability Discounting Task Instructions
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In this task you will choose between different amounts of money.
All of these outcomes are hypothetical (you will not actually receive the money).
Use the computer mouse to make your decisions.
Please make your decisions as if you were really going to receive the money.
There are no correct or incorrect choices; just make our choices so they reflect what you
really want.

66

APPENDIX D
Boredom Proneness Scale
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Before each statement below please rate the extent to which the statement applies to
you using the following scale:
1

2

Highly Disagree
_____ 1.
_____ 2.
_____ 3.
_____ 4.
_____ 5.
_____ 6.

3

4

5

6

7
Highly Agree

It is easy for me to concentrate on my activities. (Reverse)
Frequently when I am working I find myself worrying about other things.
Time always seems to be passing slowly.
I often find myself at "loose ends", not knowing what to do.
I am often trapped in situations where I have to do meaningless things.
Having to look at someone's home movies or travel slides bores me
tremendously.
_____ 7. I have projects in mind all the time, things to do. (Reverse)
_____ 8. I find it easy to entertain myself. (Reverse)
_____ 9. Many things I have to do are repetitive and monotonous.
_____ 10. It takes more stimulation to get me going than most people.
_____ 11. I get a kick out of most things I do. (Reverse)
_____ 12. I am seldom excited about my work.
_____ 13. In any situation I can usually find something to do or see to keep me
interested. (Reverse)
_____ 14. Much of the time I just sit around doing nothing.
_____ 15. I am good at waiting patiently. (Reverse)
_____ 16. I often find myself with nothing to do, time on my hands.
_____ 17. In situations where I have to wait, such as a line I get very restless.
_____ 18. I often wake up with a new idea. (Reverse)
_____ 19. It would be very hard for me to find a job that is exciting enough.
_____ 20. I would like more challenging things to do in life.
_____ 21. I feel that I am working below my abilities most of the time.
_____ 22. Many people would say that I am a creative or imaginative person. (Reverse)
_____ 23. I have so many interests, I don't have time to do everything. (Reverse)
_____ 24. Among my friends, I am the one who keeps doing something the longest.
(Reverse)
_____ 25. Unless I am doing something exciting, even dangerous, I feel half-dead and
dull.
_____ 26. It takes a lot of change and variety to keep me really happy.
_____ 27. It seems that the same things are on television or the movies all the time; it's
getting old.
_____ 28. When I was young, I was often in monotonous and tiresome
situations.
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Monetary Motivation Scale
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